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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
DENNIS L. STREETERf 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 920349-CA 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction for Cruelty to 
Animals, in violation of West Valley City Ordinance 23-5-104(8), 
a Class B Misdemeanor. This Court obtains jurisdiction pursuant 
to §78-2a-3(d) Utah Code Annotated (1992 as amended). 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal of right from final judgment of conviction 
for the offense of cruelty to animals entered in the Third 
Judicial Circuit Court in and for Salt Lake County, West Valley 
City Department, the Honorable William A. Thorne, Jr., presiding. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
Standard of Review; 
The issues presented for review pertain to whether the court 
erred in denying defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Motion for 
Reconsideration because RWVCO 23-5-104(8) is unconstitutional 
under numerous provisions of the Utah State and United States 
Constitutions. The standard of review for each of the issues on 
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review is the clear error standard as to the findings of fact of 
the court and the correction of error standard as to the court's 
legal conclusions. State v. Steward, 806 P. 2d 213, 215 
(Ut.App.Ct. 1991). The trial court's conclusions of law are 
accorded no deference and are reviewed for correctness. 
Rimensburger v. Rimensburger, 190 U.A.R. 48 (Ut.App.Ct. 1992). 
Issues on Review: 
1. Is Revised West Valley City Ordinance 23-5-104 (8) (a) 
unconstitutional pursuant to Article XI
 f Section 5 of the Utah 
State Constitution? 
2. Is Revised West Valley City Ordinance 23-5-104(8)(a) 
unconstitutional pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Utah 
Constitution, as being vague and overbroad? 
3. Is Revised West Valley City Ordinance 23-5-104(8)(a) 
preempted by Title 7, Section 2156(d) of the United States Code, 
and an unconstitutional interference with interstate commerce and 
of the right to travel? 
4. Is Revised West Valley City Ordinance 23-5-104(8)(a) 
violative of Section lf Article I of the Utah Constitution and 
therefore void? 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND ORDINANCES 
Revised West Valley City Ordinance 23-5-104(8) (1985): 
CRUELTY ANIMALS PROHIBITED. 
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(8) Animals for fighting: 
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person or 
corporation to raise, keep or use any animal, fowl or 
bird for the purposes of fighting or baiting; and for 
any person to be a party to or be present as a 
spectator at any such fighting or baiting of any animal 
or fowl; and for any person, firm or corporation to 
knowingly rent any building, shed, room, yard, ground 
or premises for any such purposes as aforesaid, or to 
knowingly suffer or permit the use of his buildings, 
sheds, rooms, yards, grounds or premises for the 
purposes aforesaid. 
(b) Law Enforcement Officers or Office of Animal 
Control officials may enter any building or place where 
there is an exhibition of the fighting or baiting of a 
live animal, or where preparations are being made for 
such an exhibition, and the Law Enforcement Officers 
may arrest persons there present and take possession of 
all animals engaged in fighting, or there found for the 
purposes of fighting, along with all implements or 
applications used in such exhibition. This provision 
shall not be interpreted to authorize a search or 
arrest without a warrant when such is required. 
Revised West Valley City Ordinance 23-2-102 (1985): 
POWERS OF ANIMAL CONTROL OFFICIALS. 
(2) The Animal Control Director, his deputies, 
assistants and Animal Control Officers are hereby 
authorized and empowered to apprehend and take with 
them and impound any animal found in violation of this 
ordinance including, but not limited to unlicensed 
dogs. 
Utah Code Annotated §10-8-84: 
Ordinances, Rules and Regulations - Passage-Penalties 
They may pass all ordinances and rules, and make all 
regulations, not repugnant to law, necessary for 
carrying into effect or discharging all powers and 
duties conferred by this chapter, and as are necessary 
and proper to provide for the safety and preserve the 
health, and promote the prosperity, improve the morals, 
peace and good order, comfort, and convenience of the 
city and its inhabitants, and for the protection of 
property in the city; and may enforce obedience to the 
-3-
ordinance with fines or penalities as they may deem 
properf but the punishment of any offense shall be by 
fine not to exceed the maximum Class B Misdemeanor fine 
under Section 76-3-3-1 or by imprisonment not to exceed 
six months, or by both the fine and imprisonment. 
Title 7 U.S.C. Section 2156, (1990): 
ANIMAL FIGHTING VENTURE PROHIBITION 
(a) Sponsoring or exhibiting animal in any fighting 
venture 
It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly 
sponsor or exhibit an animal in any animal fighting 
venture to which any animal was moved in interstate or 
foreign commerce. 
(b) Buying, selling, delivering, or 
transporting animals for participation in animal 
fighting venture 
It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly 
sell, buy, transport, or deliver to another person or 
receive from another person for purposes of 
transportation, in interstate or foreign commerce, any 
dog or other animal for purposes of having the dog or 
other animal participate in an animal fighting venture. 
(c) Use of Postal Service or other interstate 
instrumentality for promoting or furthering animal 
fighting venture 
It shcill be unlawful for any person to knowingly 
use the mail service of the United States Postal 
Service or any interstate instrumentality for purposes 
of promoting or in any other manner furthering an 
animal fighting venture except as performed outside the 
limits of the States of the United States, 
(d) Violation of State law 
Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (a), 
(b), or (c) of the section the activities prohibited by 
such subsections shall be unlawful with the respect to 
fighting ventures involving live birds only if the 
fight is to take place in a State where it would be in 
violation of laws thereof. 
United States Constitution, Article I, Section 14: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens 
of the United States and of the State wherein they 
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reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Utah State Constitution, Article I, Section 1; 
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to 
enjoy and defend their lives and liberties, to acquire, 
possess and protect property; to worship according to 
the dictates of their consciences; to assemble 
peaceably, protest against wrongs, and petition for 
redress of grievances; to communicate freely their 
thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse 
of that right. 
Utah State Constitution, Article I, Section 7; 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. 
Utah State Constitution, Article XI, Section 5: (Please see 
Addendum for text) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This matter arose as the result of a DUI stop on May 27, 
1990 (R-l. 37). Defendant was detained by West Valley City 
police authorities as he was returning from Arizona (R-l. 37) 
where defendant had engaged birds in fighting ventures where the 
sport of cockfighting is legal (R-l. 37). On May 30th, Dennis 
Streeter was charged with six counts of cruelty to animals, in 
violation of West Valley City Revised Ordinance 23-5-104, under 
Case No. 901001586 (R-l. 37). The defendant was charged with 
Case No. 901001586MC and Case No. 901001677 were 
consolidated by the Court of Appeals under Case No. 92-0349CA. 
Because the trial court's record is numbered individually under 
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raising, keeping or using poultry for the purpose of fighting. 
(Id,) The defendant was returning from having fought the birds 
in Arizona, where such fighting is legal. (Id.) 
Subsequently, on May 31, 1992, the defendant was charged 
with one additional charge of cruelty to animals under a second 
information in Case No. 901001677MC (R-2. 1). In addition, the 
defendant was charged with the following violations under that 
same information: 
(1) Doing business without a license in violation of West 
Valley City Ordinance 17-1-102; (Id.) 
(2) Improper Uses for R-l-8 zone for operating a poultry 
business in violation of Revised West Valley City Ordinance 
7-9-103; (Id.) 
(3) Improper uses for R-l-8 zone for keeping poultry in 
non-zoned area in violation of Revised West Valley Ordinance 
7-9-102; (Id.) 
(4) Too many dogs in violation of West Valley City 
Ordinance 23-1-101; (Id.) 
(5) Too many dogs in violation of West Valley City 
Ordinance 23-1-101; (Id.) 
each case number, all references to the record shall be as 
follows: R-l shall pertain to the record in Case No. 901001586 
and all references to R-2 shall pertain to Case No. 901001677. 
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(6) Failure to Obtain Rabies Vaccination in violation of 
West Valley City Ordinance 23-4-102; (Id,) 
(7) Accumulations of Solid Waste and Littering in Violation 
of West Valley City Ordinance 24-1-11; (Id.) 
(8) Improper Height for Fences in violation of West Valley 
City Ordinance 7-2-119 (R-2.). (Id.) 
The defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss the cruelty to 
animals charges brought under both Case Nos. 9010011677 and 
901001586 (R-2. 55-61), which motion was denied by memorandum 
decision, dated January 27, 1992 (R-l. 37). Subsequently, 
defendant filed a Motion to Reconsider the court's denial of 
defendant's Motion to Dismiss and presented additional grounds 
for challenging the constitutionality of West Valley City 
Ordinance 23-5-104, the violation of which was the basis of the 
cruelty to animals charges filed against the defendant (R-l. 47). 
Argument pertaining to defendant's Motion for Reconsideration was 
presented to the court on March 30, 1992 (Tr. 1-17). Said motion 
together with counsel's request for time to brief the issues set 
forth therein was denied by the court on the record of the trial 
proceeding conducted March 30, 1992 (Tr. 13) . 
On March 30, 1992, the defendant waived his right to a trial 
on the merits and entered a conditional guilty plea to count one 
of the information filed in connection with Case No. 901001586, 
to wit, cruelty to animals, a violation of West Valley City 
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Ordinance 23-5-104 (Tr. 10, 13, 19, 20). The remaining five 
charges of cruelty to animals set forth in the information were 
dismissed (R-l. 66, 67) . The defendant also entered a 
conditional guilty plea to count four of the information filed in 
connection with Case No. 901001677, to wit, cruelty to animals, a 
violation of West Valley City Ordinance 23-5-104 (Tr. 11, 13, 19, 
20) . Defendant pled guilty to counts one, two and eight of the 
information, to wit, doing business without a license, improper 
use of R-1-8 zone for operating a poultry business in an 
improperly zoned area, and accumulation of solid waste and 
littering, respectively (R-2. 74, 75). All remaining charges 
filed in connection with Case No. 901001677 were dismissed (Tr. 
11; R-2. 74, 75) . 
The defendant's reservation of right with regard to the 
conditional guilty pleas entered in both of the above-referenced 
cases, was put on the record at the sentencing proceeding and was 
incorporated into defendant's guilty plea affidavits (Tr. 10-15, 
19, 20; R-l. 17-22, 49-54). On April 30, 1992, at the hour of 
10:00 o'clock a.m., Judge William A. Thorne sentenced the 
defendant to sixty (60) days in jail and imposed a fine of 
$1,000.00 (Tr. 73; R-2. 75). Said sentence was suspended 
pursuant to defendant meeting certain terms and conditions of 
said sentence, including the absence of further violations within 
a one year period, compliance with the terms of probation, and 
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compliance wit zoning ordinances (Tr. 73; R-2. 75). The 
defendant filed a Notice of Appeal May 29, 1992, in both Case No, 
901001586 and Case No. 901001677 (R-l. 68f R-2. 76). The cases 
were consolidated by the Utah Court of Appeals under Case No. 
920349-CA on June 23, 1992. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The appellant is a resident of West Valley City, residing at 
3351 South 7200 West (R-2. 1). Appellant has operated a poultry 
business at said residence, raising game fowl which he utilizes 
for fighting outside of West Valley City and the State of Utah, 
including Arizona, where cockfighting is legal (R-l. 37; Tr. 21, 
In.13; Tr. 20, In.17). Appellant was charged with cruelty to 
animals, inter alia, when he was stopped by West Valley Police 
officers on May 29, 1992 in connection with a DUI stop (R-l. 37). 
Defendant was en route to West Valley City from Arizona, where he 
had engaged fowl in the activity of cockfighting. (Id.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Revised West Valley City Ordinance 23-5-104(8) (a) is 
unconstitutional pursuant to Article XI, Section 5 of the Utah 
Constitution as it exceeds the regulatory and lawmaking authority 
endowed West Valley City by the State of Utah and is in conflict 
with general law. The police powers conferred upon West Valley 
City by the general welfare clause empower West Valley City to 
enact only those laws which are reasonably and substantially 
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related to improving the health, safety and morals of the West 
Valley City citizenry. The ordinance at issue is not 
substantially or reasonably related to the protection of the 
general welfare of West Valley City inhabitants. Accordingly, 
Revised West Valley City Ordinance 23-5-104(8)(a) is an improper 
and unconstitutional exercise of the police powers statutorily 
conferred upon West Valley City and cannot be upheld. 
Revised West Valley City Ordinance violates both the Utah 
and United States Constitutions as it is unconstitutionally vague 
and overbroad. The ordinance is void for vagueness as it fails 
to clearly define or set forth explicit standards such that a 
person of ordinary intelligence may have an opportunity to know 
what is prohibited by the ordinance. The ordinance is also void 
for overbreadth as it sweeps within its ambit legitimate 
activities occurring outside the boundaries of West Valley City 
or the State of Utah, and constitutes an extraterritorial 
criminal statute in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution as well as Article I, Section 7, and 
Article I, Section 1 of the Utah State Constitution. 
The Ordinance violates the right to travel implicit in the 
United States and Utah Constitutions and unlawfully interferes 
with interstate commerce. The Revised West Valley City Ordinance 
effectively precludes breeders and husbandmen such as appellant 
from transporting game fowl to be used for fighting in 
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jurisdictions where the sport is legal. Moreover, the ordinance 
is preempted by federal law. The United States Congress enacted 
legislation specifically permitting the interstate shipment of 
game fowl for fighting ventures in States where such ventures are 
lawful. The ordinance directly conflicts with the objective of 
congress which chose to protect said activity and is therefore 
invalid under the supremacy clause. 
Revised West Valley City Ordinance 23-5-104(8) 
unconstitutionally interferes with the right to own and possess 
property, in violation of Article I Section 1 of the Utah 
Constitution. Any restriction upon constitutionally protected 
property rights must be balanced against the alleged evil sought 
to be corrected and the limitation of constitutional rights 
imposed by the ordinance. In the instant case, the conduct 
proscribed has no effect whatsoever on the inhabitants of West 
Valley City because the fighting of fowl owned by Appellant 
occurs outside of the territorial limits of West Valley City. 
Therefore, the ordinance is unconstitutional pursuant to Article 
I, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution as it unjustifiably 
deprives defendant/appellant of constitutionally protected 
property rights. 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANTS MOTION TO DISMISS 
AND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AS REVISED WEST VALLEY 
CITY ORDINANCE 23-5-104 VIOLATES THE UNITED STATES AND 
UTAH CONSTITUTIONS. 
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A. REVISED WEST VALLEY CITY ORDINANCE 23-5-104(8) IS IN CONFLICT 
WITH GENERAL LAW AND IS THEREFORE CONSTITUTIONALLY INVALID 
PURSUANT TO ARTICLE XI, SECTION 5 OF THE UTAH STATE 
CONSTITUTION. 
The ordinance at issue herein is ostensibly adopted to 
promote the health, safety and morals of the inhabitants of West 
Valley City. Revised West Valley City Ordinance 23-5-104 (8) (a) 
(hereinafter RWVCO 23-5-104 (8) (a)) provides, in pertinent part: 
CRUELTY TO ANIMALS PROHIBITED 
Animals for fighting: 
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person or 
corporation to raise, keep or use any animal, fowl or 
bird for the purpose of fighting or baiting; 
The ordinance in question constitutes an improper exercise 
of the powers granted to West Valley City by the State of Utah 
and is constitutionally invalid as it conflicts with general law 
and is void as ultra vires. 
As a chartered city, West Valley City is granted, inter 
alia, certain police powers by the State legislature to enact 
2 
ordinances and regulations for the benefit of the municipality. 
In addition to constitutionally conferred powers, enabling 
Article XI, Section 5 of the Utah State Constitution 
provides in pertinent part: 
Each city forming its charter under this section shall 
have, and is hereby granted, the authority to adopt and 
enforce within its limits, local police, sanitary and 
similar regulations not in conflict with general law ... 
(emphasis added). 
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statutes such as the general welfare clause, provide municipal 
authority to enact ordinances, not repugnant to law, which are 
necessary to provide for the safety, health, morals and welfare 
3 
of the city and its inhabitants. The police powers of West 
Valley City are strictly limited to those expressly granted by 
state constitution or statute. Nance v. Mayflower Tavern, Inc., 
150 P.2d 773 (1944); Salt Lake City v. Sutter, 216 P.234 (1923); 
1 C Antieua, Municipal Corporation Law Section 5.01 (1967); 1 E 
McQuillin, Municipal Corporations Section 1.93 (3d Ed. 1949). A 
municipal ordinance which exceeds the authority conferred by 
statute is invalid as ultra vires and unconstitutional as in 
conflict with general law. See e.g. , Ritholz v. City of Salt 
Lake, 284 P.2d 702 (1955); Gronlund v. Salt Lake City, 194 P.2d 
464, 466 (1948); State v. Salt Lake City, 445 P.2d 691 (1968). 
§10-8-84, Utah Code Annotated (1992) as amended provides: 
Ordinances, Rules and regulations - Passage-Penalties 
They may pass all ordinances and rules, and make all 
regulations, not repugnant to law, necessary for the carrying 
into effect or discharging all powers and duties conferred by 
this chapter, and as are necessary and proper to provide for the 
safety and preserve the health, and promote the prosperity, 
improve the morals, peace and good order, comfort and convenience 
of the city and its inhabitants, and for the protection of 
property in the city; and may enforce obedience to the ordinances 
with fines or penalties as they may deem proper, but the 
punishment of any offense shall be by fine not to exceed the 
maximum class B misdemeanor fine under Section 76-3-301 or by 
imprisonment not to exceed six months, or by both the fine and 
imprisonment. 
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While the police power conferred to West Valley City under 
the general welfare clause is broad in scope and its legitimate 
objects are broad and comprehensive, it is, nevertheless 
fundamental that the police power is limited to the promulgation 
and enforcement of measures reasonably related to a legitimate 
object for its exercise, including the public health, morals, 
comfort and safety of the municipalities inhabitants. McQuillin, 
Municipal Corporations, Section 24.09 (3rd Edition). 
Accordingly, the police power conferred upon West Valley City by 
the State of Utah is not an infinite and unlimited power. Id. 
See also, State v. Hutchison, 624 P.2d 1116, 1128 (Utah 1980) 
(Although the general welfare clause has been afforded liberal 
construction, it does not grant municipalities carte blanch nor 
limitless power to enact restrictive ordinances under the 
auspices of protecting the safety, health and welfare of its 
citizenry). Rather, only those ordinances which bear a 
substantial and reasonable relationship to the objects of 
protecting the general welfare may be upheld as a valid exercise 
of West Valley City's police power. State v. Hutchison, 624 P.2d 
1116, 1126 (1980)(When the state has granted general welfare 
powers to local governments, those governments have independent 
authority to pass ordinances which are reasonably and 
appropriately related to the objectives of that power, i.e., 
providing for the public safety health, morals and welfare); 
Parker v. Provo City Corp., 543 P.2d 769 (1975)(Municipal 
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ordinances enacted to protect public health, safety, welfare and 
well-being must bear reasonable relation to purposes). 
The issue in the instant case is thus reduced to the 
question of whether the challenged ordinance is substantially and 
reasonably related to the promotion of the prosperity and 
improvement of the health, safety and morals of the inhabitants 
of West Valley City. The circumstances of this case compel a 
negative answer; there is neither a substantial nor reasonable 
relationship between the alleged evil to be prevented (to raise, 
keep or use fowl or birds for the purpose of fighting or baiting) 
and the protection of the safety, health and morals of the 
citizens of West Valley City. 
In the instant case, the alleged evil sought to be corrected 
ostensibly has a demeaning and detrimental effect on the morals 
of the inhabitants of West Valley City. However, the detrimental 
effect could only occur if the activity to be prevented, the 
fighting of fowl or birds, occurred within the boundaries of West 
Valley City where the citizenry may witness or otherwise be 
4 
directly or indirectly effected by the activity. There is 
In Peck v. Dunn, 574 P.2d 367 (1978), the Utah Supreme 
Court recognized that "it is now generally thought that the 
witnessing of animals fighting, injuring and perhaps killing one 
another is a cruel and barbarous practice, discordant to man's 
better instincts and so offensive to his finer sensibilities that 
it is demeaning to morals. Id. at 369 (emphasis added). The 
operative language in the court's statement is "witnessing." 
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not a scintilla of evidence in this record on appeal that the 
fowl raised by Appellant is utilized for the purpose of fighting 
within West Valley City or within the State of Utah. To the 
contrary, the record reflects that Appellant utilizes the birds, 
raised and kept at his residence, for fighting in jurisdictions 
far distant from Utah, including Arizona (R-l. 37, (T. 20, In. 
15-18, 21, In 11-14). 
It is inconceivable that the fighting of fowl or birds 
outside the State of Utah could have any affect or impact, 
detrimental or otherwise, on the citizenry of West Valley City. 
The act of raising, keeping, or using fowl or birds for the 
purpose of fighting outside of the geographical boundaries of 
West Valley City has no tenable relationship whatsoever to the 
general welfare of West Valley City citizens. Similarly, the act 
of selling or transferring game fowl to third persons who may 
eventually utilize the birds for fighting in a foreign 
jurisdiction has no impact whatsoever on the morals of West 
5 Valley City inhabitants. Accordingly, the proscribed activity 
Presumably, if the activity does not occur within a 
locality where citizens may witness or otherwise be effected by 
the activity there is no direct or indirect impact upon the 
morals of the numbers of the community. 
5 
The act of raising does not require the birds to be fought. 
To the contrary, the raising of specific fighting breeds of birds 
require the birds be kept separate in order to prevent injury as 
the birds will fight instinctively if kept together. J.W. 
Cooper, M.D., Game Fowls, Their Origin and History, p. 35 
(standard edition) (1869). 
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does not so effect the morals and welfare as to justify the 
interdiction imposed by RWVCO 23-5-104(8). Any other finding 
would be unconstitutional as the challenged ordinance would be 
given extraterritorial effect, in violation of the due process 
g 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 
Moreover, a finding of validity would be inconsistent with state 
precedent. The Utah Supreme Court has struck down as ultra vires 
numerous ordinances enacted under the general welfare clause 
which proscribed conduct not immediately related to the 
protection of public welfare, including ordinances that sought to 
7 8 
prohibit keeping pin ball machines, playing pool, advertising 
9 10 
prescription eyeglasses, fixing barbershops1 closing hours, 
It is axiomatic that West Valley City has no authority to 
legislate beyond the boundaries of the municipality. American 
Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.y 213 U.S. 347 (1909) (A Statute 
must be limited In its operation and effect to the territorial 
limits over which the lawmaker has general and legitimate power. 
Id. at 357. All legislation is prima facie territorial.) Id. 
RWVCO 23-5-104(8) clearly constitutes an extraterritorial 
criminal statute as it allows criminal prosecution of an 
individual who may "raise, keep or use fowl or birds for the 
purpose of fighting" without requiring proof that the owner 
intends to engage in animal fighting within the geographic 
boundaries of West Valley City, or even within the State of Utah. 
7
 Stevenson v. Salt Lake City, 317 P.2d 597 (1957). 
o 
American Fork City v. Robinson, 292 P.249 (1930). 
9Ritholz v. City of Salt Lake, 284 P.2d 702 (1955). 
10
 Salt Lake City v. Revenue, 124 P.2d 537 (1942). 
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and possessing alcohol without authorization. 
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the ordinance at 
issue does not satisfy the test of validity required by law as 
there is no substantial or reasonable relationship between the 
conduct proscribed thereunder and the protection of the general 
welfare of the* citizens of West Valley City. There is no 
evidence in this record on appeal that the fowl raised by 
Appellant is fought in West Valley City. Accordingly, there is 
no tenable relationship whatsoever between the alleged evil to be 
prevented and the moral well being of the community. Thereforef 
the challenged ordinance is an improper and unconstitutional 
exercise of Appellee's state endowed police powers and is invalid 
as ultra vires and as in conflict with general law. 
B. WEST VALLEY CITY ORDINANCE §23-5-104(8)(a) IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL, BEING VOID FOR BOTH VAGUENESS AND 
OVERBREADTH. 
Appellant submits that RWVCO §23-5-104 (8) (a), which provides 
that fl[i]t shall be unlawful for any person or corporation to 
raise, keep or use any animal, fowl or bird for the purpose of 
fighting or baiting;" regardless of whether such "fowl or bird" 
engages in fighting or baiting within the boundaries of West 
Valley City, is unconstitutional as being void for vagueness and 
overbreadth, in violation of Article I, Section 7 and Article I, 
Salt Lake City v. Sutter, 216 P.234 (1923). 
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Section 1 of the Constitution of the State of Utah, and the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, 
I. VAGUENESS 
The due process clause of the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution require that a 
criminal statute be declared void when it is so vague that "men 
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and 
differ as to its application." Connally v. General Constr. Co., 
269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926); see also Roberts v. United States 
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 629 (1984); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 
379 (1979). 
The Supreme Court has explained the relationship between due 
process and vagueness as follows: 
It is a basic principle of due process that an 
enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are 
not clearly defined. Vague laws offend several 
important values. First, because we assume that man is 
free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we 
insist that laws give the person of ordinary 
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is 
prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws; 
may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. 
Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is 
to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards 
for those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly 
delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, 
and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective 
basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and 
discriminatory application. Third, but related, where 
a vague statute "abuts upon sensitive areas of basic 
First Amendment freedoms," it "operates to inhibit the 
12 
A statute which is uncertain as to persons who may fall 
within its scope will also be found unconstitutionally vague. 
See Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939). 
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exercise of those freedoms." Uncertain meanings 
inevitably lead citizens to "'steer far wider of the 
unlawful zone1 . . . than if the boundaries of the 
forbidden areas were clearly marked." 
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 
(1972) (citations omitted). See also Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 
352jf 257-58 (1983) (citations omitted) ("where the legislature 
fails to provide . . . minimal guidelines [to govern law 
enforcement], a criminal statute may permit 'a standardless sweep 
that allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their 
13 personal predilections1.") ; Dae Woo Kim v. City of New York, 
774 F.Supp. 164, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (citations omitted) (a 
statute is unconstitutionally vague if it "lacks clear definition 
or explicit standards sush that it does not give a person of 
ordinary intelligence an opportunity to know what is 
prohibited"). 
The Utah Supreme Court has articulated a similar test for 
vagueness. In State v. Blowers, 717 P.2d 1321 (1986), the Utah 
Supreme Court struck down a conviction applying a driving while 
intoxicated ordinance to the rider of a horse, stating that "[a] 
The three standards set forth by the court are independent 
of each other. Thus, a statute may offend due process simply by 
violating one of the three standards. See generally LaFave and 
Scott, Substantive Criminal Law, Section 2.3, at 128-32 (1986). 
See also NAACP v. Burton, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). 
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criminal statute 'must be sufficiently clear and definite to 
inform persons of ordinary intelligence what their conduct must 
be to conform to its requirements and to advise one accused of 
violating it what constitutes the offense with which he is 
charged1." Id. at 1322, citing Greaves v. State, 528 P.2d 805, 
807 (Utah 1974) (citations omitted). The court held the attempt 
by the State to apply the Utah Motor Vehicle Code to persons 
riding animals on a municipal roadway was too vague to survive 
constitutional due process challenge. 
Thus, the preliminary question to be determined by this 
Court is whether RWVCO §23-5-104(8) (a) gives a person of ordinary 
intelligence "a reasonable opportunity to know what is 
prohibited, so that he may act accordingly." Grayned. It is 
clear that a person of ordinary intelligence likely may not 
understand what it is to "raise, keep or use any animal, fowl or 
bird for the purpose of fighting or baiting," since the ordinance 
fails to state the territorial boundaries of the proscribed 
conduct. Consequently, it would be almost impossible that such a 
person can reasonably conduct himself or herself to conform to 
such a law. 
Relying on the principle enunciated in Grayned, the Kansas 
Supreme Court recently struck down a Wichita erotic dancing 
ordinance. In City of Wichita v. Wallace, 788 P. 2d 270 (Kan. 
1990), the court found the Wichita ordinance unconstitutionally 
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vague for a number of reasons, including failure to adequately 
define the proscribed conduct, overbreadth, and failure to 
require a scienter or intent requirement. Id. Appellant submits 
that the West Valley City Ordinance contains numerous 
deficiencies similar to those found in the Wichita ordinance. 
Subsection (8) (a) , under which Appellant was convicted, 
lacks a scienter or intent requirement, thereby rendering the 
ordinance void for vagueness. See Morisette v. United States, 
324 U.S. 246, 250 (1952) (fundamental principle of American 
criminal jurisprudence is "that an injury can amount to a crime 
only when inflicted by intention."). For example, under 
§23-5-104(8)(a), virtually anyone who owns fowl or birds for the 
purpose of raising to sell for participation in animal fighting 
ventures in a jurisdiction in which fighting or baiting is legal, 
is subject to criminal prosecution, based upon their mere 
ownership of the gamefowl. The ordinance does not require that 
an individual be charged with fighting such animals, fowl or 
birds in the State of Utah; it does not distinguish between 
ownership" for the purpose of fighting or baiting" in states 
where the sport is legal and states where it is not; it does not 
distinguish between breeding and selling such birds for "fighting 
or baiting" to breeders in states where the sport of gamefighting 
is legal and states where it is not. Rather, the statute sweeps 
with a broad brush and encompasses ownership of any bird which is 
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kept or raised for "fighting or baiting" even though that 
activity is perfectly legal in certain states, and has been so 
for a hundred years. (R-2. 57) Therefore, a person who 
unknowingly possesses fowl or birds which could be used for 
"fighting or baiting," or which may be sold in a state where such 
"fighting or baiting" is legal, would be punished under RWVCO 
§23-5-104 (8) (a). The Kansas Supreme Court found a similar 
ordinance lacking an intent requirement to be unconstitutionally 
vague. This Court should similarly declare RWVCO §23-5-104(8)(a) 
unconstitutionally vague for violating the basic criminal rule 
that no crime is committed unless the suspect acted with a 
criminal intent. 
II. OVERBREADTH 
In addition to being unconstitutionally vague, Appellant 
asserts that RWVCO §23-5-104(8) (a) is unconstitutionally 
overbroad, because a person of ordinary intelligence cannot 
discern what is actually being prohibited by the ordinance and 
because it includes within its prohibitions legitimate and lawful 
conduct. The void-for-vagueness doctrine and the doctrine of 
overbreadth are related but distinct. A vague law or ordinance 
"denies due process by imposing standards of conduct so 
indeterminate that it is impossible to ascertain just what will 
result in sanctions; in contrast, a law that is overbroad may be 
perfectly clear but impermissibly purport to penalize protected 
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. . . activity." Hastings v. Judicial Conference of U.S., 485 
U.S. 1014, 829 F.2d 91, 105 (D.C.Cir. 1987); see also Dae Woo Kim 
v. City of New York, 774 F.Supp. 164, 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) 
(quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. at 114) (a statute 
is "unconstitutionally overbroad if it includes within its 
prohibitions constitutionally protected conduct"). 
In Logan City v. Huber, 786 P.2d 1372 (1990), the Utah Court 
of Appeals stiruck down a city ordinance, stating that "[a]n 
overbroad enactment is one 'which does not aim specifically at 
evils within the allowable area of state control but, on the 
contrary, sweeps within its ambit other activities that in 
ordinary circumstances constitute an exercise of 
[constitutionally guaranteed] freedomfs]'." Id. at 1375, quoting 
Waters v. McGuriman, 656 F.Supp. 923, 925 (E.D.Pa. 1987). The 
court struck down the Logan City ordinance, which proscribed 
obscene or abusive language spoken with the intent "to cause 
public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly creating 
a risk thereof," as being unconstitutionally overbroad, because 
the ordinance "punishes as disorderly conduct a significant 
amount of protected verbal expression, including criticism and 
challenge, vulgarities and remonstrations, whether it is directed 
at a police officer, an ordinary citizen, or one who is not even 
present, without regard for its likely impact . . .." Id. at 
1376. 
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In the instant case, RWVCO §23-5-104(8)(a) is overbroad in 
numerous respects. The ordinance provides that an individual 
commits a crime if he: "raise[s], keep[s] or use[s] any animal, 
fowl or bird for the purpose of fighting or baiting . . .." The 
problem with this sweeping language is that it prohibits conduct, 
such as the simple possession of the game birds in West Valley 
City, which may be utilized for legal and legitimate activities 
in foreign jurisdictions. 
Section 23-5-104 (8) (a) is overbroad because it rests on 
"confusing and ambiguous criteria" which are subject to varying 
interpretations by those who enforce and are effected by the 
statute. Colautti, supra; Kolender, supra. There is little 
question that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess 
as to its meaning and differ as to its application. Greenwood v. 
City of North Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816 (Utah 1991). It is unclear 
if the ordinance simply proscribes ownership of birds which are 
actively being used for "fighting and baiting" in the State of 
Utah, or prohibits the possession of gamefowl in the State of 
Utah, where the owner occasionally drives to Arizona and uses the 
bird for "fighting or baiting" where the sport is legal. One 
cannot reasonably determine whether it prohibits breeding and 
raising gamefowl in the State of Utah - without fighting such 
gamefowl - and selling the hatchlings to members of Gamefowl 
Breeders Associations in Arizona, where they will legally be used 
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for "fighting or baiting" by members of those organizations. 
Therefore, RWVCO §23-5-104(8)(a) is both vague and overbroad, 
because it does not allow an individual of common intelligence to 
know whether he or she has committed a crime, and it sweeps 
within its ambit activities which are perfectly legitimate. 
In addition, the ordinance invites unequal and arbitrary 
enforcement (Kolender, supra; Colautti, supra.) because West 
14 Valley City Ordinance §2-102-8 allows the "Animal Control 
Director or any person employed by the Department of Animal 
Control as an Animal Control Officer" ad hoc judgment as to which 
birds are being owned and raised for "fighting and baiting" — 
without requiring proof that the bird has actually been used for 
animal fighting in the State of Utah — an enormous amount of 
15 
subjective judgment is interjected into the statute. The 
ordinance is therefore unconstitutionally overbroad as it creates 
West Valley City Ordinance §23-1-102(2), which is not at 
issue in the instant case, delineates the "Powers of Animal 
Control Officers," and vests authority in the "Animal Control 
Director or any person employed by the Department of Animal 
Control as an Animal Control Officer" to have the authority and 
power to "apprehend and take with them and impound any animal 
found in violation of this ordinance." 
If fighting paraphernalia is discovered in proximity of a 
bird, this ordinance seems to allow the inference that the owner 
possesses the bird for "fighting or baiting" and justify that the 
owner become the subject of a criminal prosecution, even though 
the use of such paraphernalia is equally common to gamefowl 
raised for show purposes, and never fought. (T. 17). 
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a "standardless sweep [that] allows policemen, prosecutors, and 
juries to pursue their personal predilections." Kolender, supra, 
461 U.S. at 358. 
Finally, RWVCO, which allows criminal prosecution where an 
individual keeps, raises or uses a fowl or bird for the purpose 
of fighting or baiting without requiring proof that the owner 
intends to engage in animal fighting within West Valley City, or 
even in the State of Utah, is overbroad as it amounts to an 
extraterritorial criminal statute, in violation of the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution. RWVCO is limited in its operation and effect to 
the territorial limits over which the West Valley City Council 
has general and legitimate power. American Banana Co. v. United 
Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, (1909). All legislation is prima facie 
territorial. Id. at 357. Accordingly, West Valley City simply 
cannot sweep within the proscribed conduct of the ordinance 
legitimate activities occurring in foreign jurisdictions far 
beyond its territorial boundaries. 
Accordingly, the ordinance is unconstitutionally overbroad 
as it fails to specifically aim at evils within the allowable 
area of state control and sweeps with its ambit legitimate 
activities which constitute an exercise of constitutionally 
protected freedoms. Logan City v. Huber, 786 P.2d 1372, 1375 
(1990) . 
-27-
Based upon the foregoing, this court should find RWVCO 
23-5-104(8) unconstitutional as being void for vagueness, in 
addition to being overbroad. 
C. RWVCO UNCONSTITUTIONALLY INTERFERES WITH INTERSTATE 
COMMERCE AND TRAVEL AND IS FEDERALLY PREEMPTED BY 
7 U.S.C. §2156(d). 
RWVCO 23-5-104 (8) , which makes it a criminal offense to 
"raise, keep, or use" a fowl or bird for the purpose of fighting, 
violates the right to travel implicit in the United States and 
Utah Constitutions as well as interferes with interstate 
commerce. 
The challenged ordinance does not limit itself to outlawing 
cockfighting within the boundaries of the State of Utah. Rather, 
the ordinance imposes a blanket prohibition upon the "keep[ing], 
rais[ing], or us[ing] any game fowl for the purpose of animal 
fighting" thus creating a criminal offense for the mere 
possession (i.e. keeping) of birds which one intends to transport 
to another State for use where cockfighting is legal. 
Such an overreaching law impinges upon the fundamental right 
to travel embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution. See Shapiro v. ThompsonP 394 U.S. 618 (1969). It 
also impinges upon the right to travel implicit in Article I, 
Section 1 of the Utah Constitution. 
The Ordinance at issue impinges upon the rights to travel 
interstate, and the right to engage in interstate commerce, of 
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citizens of all fifty states, by prohibiting individuals from 
travelling through West Valley City in possession of gamefowl 
which is intended to be used "for animal fighting/1 even if such 
fighting is to take place in a state where the sport is perfectly 
legal. Under the ordinance, if a citizen of Arizona, (where the 
sport is legal) travels through West Valley City on the way to a 
cockfight in Puerto Rico (where the sport is also legal), he or 
she is guilty of a criminal offense. Similarly, if a West Valley 
City resident raises birds for cockfighting, as appellant does, 
and ships them from the Salt Lake City Airport to Arizona (where 
the sport is legal) , he or she is guilty of a criminal offense. 
The statute thus unconstitutionally impedes the flow of commerce 
interstate and violates the constitutional right of interstate 
travel both of residents of West Valley City and residents of all 
fifty States. 
The egregious constitutional violation imposed by the 
ordinance, which essentially bans Appellant from raising fowl and 
from transporting fowl or traveling with fowl to cockfighting 
competitions in States where the sport is legal, is further 
evidenced by the fact that the United States Congress has 
preempted the area by permitting such activity. 
In 1976, Congress enacted significant amendments to Title 7 
U.S.C., Section 2156, entitled "Animal Fighting Venture 
Prohibition," which made it unlawful to: (a) sponsor or exhibit 
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an animal fighting venture; (b) Buy, sell, deliver or transport 
any animal in interstate commerce for participation in any animal 
17 fighting venture; or(c) Use the mail services of the U.S. 
18 Postal Service to promote animal fighting. 
Significantly, Congress created a specific exemption for 
individuals who own birds and transport them to States where 
fighting ventures are legal. Subsection (d) of 7 U.S.C. §2156 
provides: 
Violation of State Law; Notwithstanding the provisions 
of subsections (a) , (b) or (c) of this section, the 
activities prohibited by such subsections shall be 
unlawful with respect to fighting ventures involving 
live birds only if the fight is to take place in a 
State where it would be in violation of the laws 
thereof. Id. (emphasis added) 
7 U.S.C. 2156(a) provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly sponsor or 
exhibit an animal in any animal fighting venture to which any 
animal was moved in interstate or foreign commerce. 
1 7
 7 U.S.C. 2156(b) provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly sell, buy, 
transport, or deliver to another person or receive from another 
person for purposes of transportation, in interstate or foreign 
commerce, any dog or other animal for purposes of having the dog 
or other animal participate in an animal fighting venture. 
18
 7 U.S.C. 2156(c) provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly use the 
mail service of the United States Postal Service or any 
interstate instrumentality for purposes of promoting or in any 
other manner furthering an animal fighting venture except as 
performed outside the limits of the States of the United States. 
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Thus Congress has entered this area of regulation and has 
explicitly and/or implicitly created a right to travel interstate 
for the purpose of selling, breeding, or fighting live birds 
where the sport of cockfighting is legal. The federal statute 
thus serves to preempt State laws which would enter the sphere of 
regulation in which Congress has already acted, and prevents 
States from enacting laws which come in conflict with the federal 
scheme. 
Congress has specifically provided for preemption in this 
area, as evidence by 7 U.S.C. 2156(h), which provides: 
Conflict with State Law 
the provisions of this chapter shall not supersede or 
otherwise invalidate any such State, local, or 
municipal legislation or ordinance relating to animal 
fighting ventures except in case of a direct and 
irreconcilable conflict between any requirements 
thereunder and this chapter or any rule, regulation, or 
standard hereunder. Id. (emphasis added). 
Since Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824) the United States 
Supreme Court has emphasized that "acts of the State 
Legislatures. . . [which] interfere with, or are contrary to the 
laws of Congress, made in pursuance of the constitution," are 
invalid under the Supremacy Clause. Id. at 211. The keystone of 
federal preemption analysis is the determination of whether a 
challenged State statute "stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives 
of Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); Perez 
v. Campbell, 401 U.S. 637, 649 (1970). 
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In Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp,, 331 U.S. 218 (1946), the 
Court held that congressional intent to preempt state regulations 
could be evidenced "if the enactment of a state policy produces a 
result inconsistent with the objective of the federal statute." 
Id. at 230. Even "when congress has not completely displaced 
state regulations, federal law may nonetheless preempt state law 
to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law." 
California Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 107 S.Ct. 683, 
689 (1987) . This is particularly true if compliance with both 
laws may be physically impossible or the state law may stand "as 
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
purposes and objectives of Congress." Id. (quoting Florida Lime 
& Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-143 (1963)). 
In the instant case, RWVCO 23-5-104(8) clearly produces a 
result inconsistent with the objective of the federal statute. 
Id. Congressional intent, apparent in the text of the act, was 
to permit the shipment of birds to States where cockfighting is 
lawful, despite the lawfulness of cockfighting in the State of 
origin. The West Valley City Ordinance makes it impossible for 
West Valley City breeders and husbandmen, such as Appellant, to 
ship birds from Utah to other States or countries, because, under 
the ordinance, any possession of the birds in West Valley City 
with intent that they be fought anywhere in the world is 
unlawful, even if that activity is legal in the State or country 
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of destination. Thus, the West Valley City Ordinance makes 
criminal the very activity Congress specifically chose to exempt 
from prosecution under the federal law. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently struck down State 
laws where their "administration . . . would conflict with the 
operation of the federal plan." City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air 
Terminal, 411 U.S. 624, 539 (1972); Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 
U.S. 497, 509 (1955); Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 
490-91 (1951). The West Valley City Ordinance creates an 
"irreconcilable conflict" with federal law, as embodied in 7 
U.S.C. Section 2156, Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., supra. 
Indeed, the legislative history of the federal statute indicates 
that the interstate shipment of gamefowl for breeding purposes, 
and for fighting ventures in States where such ventures are 
lawful, is a protected activity under the statute. See, Pub.L. 
19 94-279, 1976 U.S. Code Cong, and Adm. News., p.797. Therefore, 
the challenged ordinance which prohibits Appellant from keeping 
The intent of 7 U.S.C, 2156(d) is evidenced by the 
following conference substitute contained in the legislative 
history of the Animal Welfare Act: The Conference substitute 
adopts the House provision with an amendment which provides that 
the activities prohibited by subsections (a), (b), or (c) of new 
section 26 of the act shall be unlawful with respect to fighting 
ventures involving live birds only if the fight is to take place 
in a State where it would be in violation of the laws thereof. 
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or raising game fowl ultimately to be fought in places where such 
fighting is lawful, conflicts with federal law and is invalid 
under the supremacy clause. 
D. WEST VALLEY CITY ORDINANCE §23-5-104(8) (a) IS VIOLATIVE 
OF SECTION 1 ARTICLE I OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AND 
THEREFORE VOID AS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTION UPON THE 
RIGHT TO OWN AND POSSESS PROPERTY. 
"All men have the inherent and inalienable right to ... 
possess and protect property." 
Article I, Section 1, Constitution of Utah. 
RWVCO 23-5-104(8) runs head long into this constitutional 
guarantee when it makes it unlawful to raise, keep, or use a fowl 
or bird for admittedly legal purposes, which have no effect upon 
the public interest or general welfare of the citizens of West 
Valley City. 
The city did not contend below that the raising and keeping 
of fighting cocks, alone, would run afoul (no pun intended) of 
city ordinances. Rather it is the raising of birds for the 
purposes of fighting which is claimed to subject appellant to 
criminal sanctions. 
The section does not apply to export of live birds to foreign 
countries nor to interstate shipment of live birds for breeding 
purposes. Game fowl publications would be unaffected except that 
advertising of fights involving live birds would be prohibited 
except in those instances where such fights are to be held in a 
State or territory where they are not unlawful. 
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In determining the propriety of such a proscriptionf any 
limitation imposed upon the constitutional right to own and 
possess property in light of Article I, Section 1 of Utah's 
Constitution "must take into consideration the balance between 
the alleged evil sought to be corrected and the limitation on 
constitutional rights the ordinance would impose." Ritholz v. 
City of Salt Lake, 284 P.2d 702, 705 (S.Ct. Utah 1955). 
Ritholz dealt with a city ordinance which sought to prohibit 
advertising the price of prescription eyeglasses. In holding the 
ordinance unconstitutional, the court noted the lack of evidence 
"to show any relationship between advertising eyewear and public 
health." Id^ at 704. 
Similarly there has been no showing, nor can there be, that 
Appellant's subjective intent, to engage some of his fowl in 
legal sport outside of this state, creates some "evil" or "hazard 
to public health" against which Appellant's right to possess and 
raise game cocks must be balanced. 
Just as the Ritholz court prevented the city from unduly 
restraining the advertising and business practices of persons who 
sought to advertise eyewear, the Utah Constitution does not allow 
West Valley City to interfere with Appellant's business or hobby 
of raising show and game cocks absent a nexus between that 
activity and some dilitarious affect on public health, welfare or 
morals. See also, Pride Oil Co. v. Salt Lake County, 370 P.2d 
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355 (Utah 1962) (restrained as unconstitutional a statute 
relating to posting of gasoline prices.) 
Appellant does not contend that his property rights are 
absolute - where some important public interest requires 
safeguarding of health, morals, safety or welfare - even the most 
basic property rights may be limited. The problem with the 
present ordinance however is that in its application to Appellant 
it punishes conduct which will take place if at all, outside of 
the City of West Valley. Therefore, it cannot seriously be 
questioned that the evil to be corrected has no tenable 
relationship whatsoever to protecting the public interest of the 
citizenry of West Valley City. Accordingly, the ordinance is 
unconstitutional as it unjustifiably infringes upon Appellant's 
constitutionally protected right to own, possess and use his 
property. 
Appellant's property rights should not be made to yield to 
meer convenience and expediency. It is the function of this 
court to look beyond the first blush impression of the enactment 
to see whether there is a sound basis to justify the city in 
proscribing and prosecuting Appellant's act of raising poultry 
with the intent to use them in a legal fashion outside of the 
State. See, Backman v. Bateman, 263 P.2d 561, (S.Ct. Utah 1953). 
Accordingly, RWVCO 23-5-104(8) is unconstitutional pursuant to 
Article I, Section 1 of the Utah State Constitution as there is 
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no justifiable basis thereunder for imposing limitations upon 
Appellant's constitutionally protected property rights. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
Based on the foregoing, RWVCO 23-5-104(8)(a) is 
unconstitutional and the court erred in denying 
defendant/appellant's Motion to Dismiss and Motion for 
Reconsideration. Accordingly, the Appellant's judgment and 
conviction of cruelty to animals, in violation of RWVCO 
23-5-104(8)(a), heretofore entered by Judge William A. Thorne, 
Jr. in the Third Circuit Court in and for Salt Lake County, West 
Valley Department, State of Utah, should be overturned. 
DATED this // day of September, 1992. 
CONDER & WANGSGARD 
Micelle J. \v}4/ \s 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the //t//%y of September, 1992, I 
caused to be mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to the following 
counsel of record: 
J. Richard Catten 
West Valley City Prosecutor 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent 
3600 South 2700 West 
West Valley City, Utah 84119 
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STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
AND ORDER 
Case No. 901001677 MC 
Judge William A. Thorne 
COMES NOW, DENNIS STREETER, the defendant in this case and 
hereby acknowledges and certifies the following: 
I have entered a plea of guilty to the following crimes of 
(1) Doing Business without a License, violation of West Valley 
City Municipal Ordinance i 17-1-102; (2) Improper Use For R-l-8 
Zone, to wit: Operating a poultry business in an R-18 zone, 
violation of West Valley City Ordinance 7-9-103; and (3) 
Accumulation of Solid Waste & Littering, violation of West Valley 
City Municipal Ordinance 24-1-11.. I further enter a conditional 
guilty plea to the charge of Cruelty to Animals, a violation of 
West Valley City Ordinance 23-5-104, and enter said plea 
conditionally, specifically reserving the right to challenge the 
constitutionality of said ordinance on appeal. 
I understand that the penalties provided for my plea of 
guilty to the above referenced violations are as follows: 
17-1-102, 7-9-103, and 24-1-11 are class B Misdemeanors for which 
a maximum fine of $1,000.00 may be imposed and/or a maximum 
sentence of six months imprisonment for each offense. I further 
understand that the penalties provided for violation of West 
Valley City Municipal Ordinance 23-5-104, a class B Misdemeanor, 
to which I am entering a conditional plea, carries a maximum fine 
of $1,000.00 and/or maximum imprisonment of up to six months in 
jail. I have recieved a copy of the information against me. I 
have read it, and I understand the nature and the elements of the 
offenses for which I am entering a guilty plea and/or a 
conditional plea of guilty. 
The elements of the crimes with which I am charged are as 
follows: A person commits cruelty to animals under WVC Ordinance 
23-5-104 if he raises, keeps, or uses any animal, fowl or bird 
for the purpose of fighting or baiting; A person commits a crime 
under WVC Municipal Ordinance 17-1-102 if he operates a business 
without a license; A person commits a crime under WVC Municipal 
Ordinance 7-9-103 if he operates a poultry business in a zone 
designated as R-l-8; A person commits a crime under WVC Municipal 
Ordinance 24-1-11 if he permits solid waste and/or litter to 
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accumulate on property where there exists no zoning authority to 
do so, 
I am entering this plea voluntarily and with knowledge and 
understanding of the following facts: 
1. I know that I have the right to be represented by an 
attorney and that if I cannot afford one, an attorney will be 
appointed by the court at no cost to me. 
2. I have not waived my right to counsel. My attorney is 
Michelle J. Ivie and I have had an opportunity to discuss this 
statement, my rights and the consequences of my guilty plea with 
my attorney. 
3. I know that I have a right to a trial by jury. 
4. I know that if I wish to have a trial I have the right 
to confront and cross-examine witnesses against me or to have 
them cross-examined by my attorney. I also know that I have the 
right to compel my witness(es) by subpoena at state expense to 
testify in court upon my behalf. 
5. I know that I have a right to testify in my own behalf 
but if I choose not to do so I cannot be compelled to testify or 
give evidence against myself and no adverse inferences will be 
drawn against me if I do not testify. 
6. I know that if I wish to contest the charges against me 
I need only plead "not guilty" and the matter will be set for 
trial. At the trial the State of Utah will have the burden of 
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proving each element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. If 
the trial is before a jury, the verdict must be unanimous. 
7. I know that under the Constitution of Utah that if I 
were tried and convicted by a jury or by the judge that I would 
have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Utah 
Court of Appeals or, where allowed, the Utah Supreme Court and 
that if I could not afford to pay the* costs for such appeal, 
those costs would be paid by the state. 
8. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each 
offense to which I plead guilty. I know that by pleading guilty 
to an offense that carries a minimum mandatory sentence that I 
will be subjecting myself to serving a minimum mandatory sentence 
for that offense. I know that the sentences may be consecutive 
and may be for a prison term, fine, or both. I know that in 
addition to a fine a twenty-five percent (25%) surcharge, 
required by Utah Code Annotated §63-63a-4, will be imposed. I 
also know that I may be ordered by the court to make restitution 
to any victim(s) of my crimes. 
9. I know that imprisonment may be for consecutive periods, 
or the fine for additional amounts, if my plea is to more than 
one charge. I also know that if I am on probation, parole, or 
awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I have been 
convicted or to which I have plead guilty, my plea in the present 
action may result in consecutive sentences being imposed upon me. 
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10. I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am 
waiving my statutory and constitutional rights set out in the 
preceding paragraphs, with the exception of my conditional guilty 
plea pursuant to which I specifically reserve my constitutional 
right to appeal the validity of WVC Ordinance 23-5-104, I also 
know that by entering such plea, I am admitting and do so admit 
that I have committed the conduct alleged and I am guilty of the 
crimes for which my plea is entered. 
11. My plea of guilty is the result of a plea bargain, to 
wit: the prosecutor has agreed to dismiss the remaining counts of 
the information against me. As further part of that plea bar-
gain, the prosecutor has agreed to dismiss a case pending against 
me in the circuit court before Judge William A. Thorne. The 
prosecution and defendant have also agreed that the defendant may 
enter the plea set forth above while preserving the right to 
appeal the court's ruling on the constitutionality and validity 
of West Valley City Ordinance 23-5-104, and the defendant 
expressly reserves his right to appeal the courtfs denial of his 
motion to dismiss. 
12. I know and understand that if I desire to withdraw my 
plea of guilty I must do so by filing a motion within thirty (30) 
days after entry of my plea, but that if I do not receive pro-
bation the State will stipulate to the withdrawal of this plea. 
-5-
13. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or 
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a 
reduction of the charges for sentencing made or sought by either 
defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding on 
the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as 
to what they believe the court may do are also not binding on the 
court. 
14. No threats, coercion, or unlawful influence of any kind 
have been made to induce me to plead guilty, and no promises 
except those contained herein have been made to me. 
15. I have read this statement or I have had it read to me 
by my attorney, and I understand its provisions. I know that I 
am free to change or delete anything contained in this statement. 
I do not wish to make any changes because all of the statements 
are correct. 
16. I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my 
attorney. 
17. I am 43 years of age; I have attended high school and I 
can read and understand the English language or an interpreter 
has been provided to me. I was not under the influence of any 
drugs, medication or intoxicants which would impair my judgment 
when the decision was made to enter the plea. I am not presently 
under the influence of any drug, medication or intoxicants which 
impair my judgment. 
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18. I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind, 
mentally capable of understanding the proceedings and the conse-
quences of my plea and free of any mental disease, defect or 
impairment that would prevent me from knowingly, intelligently 
and voluntarily entering my plea. 
DATED this ,9V day of /j/f /\ /? , 1992. 
Is C ^ ^ W ^ ^ 
SUBSCRIBED <MAND^ WGREI Uo before me 
ori^ls^J^^Sait^^^aqch, 1992. 
l%>~%> ^^£l^l&J ><^^ ~^/7 Notary Public 
I '^il:l^' _3rATE0FjJTAH _j CERTIFICATE OF ATTORNEY^ 
I certify that I am the attorney for Dennis Streeter, the 
defendant above, and that I know he has read the statement or 
that I have read it to him and I have discussed it with him and 
believe he fully understands the meaning of its contents and is 
mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge 
and belief after an appropriate investigation, the elements of 
the crimes and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal 
conduct are correctly stated and these, along with the other 
representations and declarations made by the defendant in the 
foregoing affidavit, are accurate and true. 
MICHEZLE J. IVIE 
Attorney for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in 
the case against Dennis Streeter, defendant. I have reviewed 
this statement of the defendant and find that the declaration, 
including the elements of the offense of the charge and the 
factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct which 
constitutes the offense are true and correct. No improper 
inducements, threats or coercion to encourage a plea have been 
offered defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained in 
the statement and in the attached plea agreement or as 
supplemented on record before the court. There is reasonable 
cause to believe that the evidence would support the conviction 
of defendant for the offense for which the plea is entered and 
acceptance of the plea would serve the__public interest. 
/ 
Z r/ ttXh-
KEITH L . STONI 
West Valley CitV Prosecutor 
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ORDER 
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing statement 
and the certification of the defendant and counsel, the court 
witnesses the signatures and finds the defendant's plea of guilty 
together with defendant's conditional plea of guilty, all freely 
and voluntarily made and it is so ordered that the defendant's 
plea of guilty, and conditional plea of guilty to the charges set 
forth in the statement be accepted and entered, 
DONE IN COURT this y/1^ day of / ^ L ^ ^ C , 1992, 
WILLIAM^ A. THORNE f^ 
Pis£y±gt Court Judge ,' 
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FILED 
9 2 MAR 31 AM 8:51* 
MICHELLE J. I V I E (#5723) CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT 
o f C O N D E R & W A N G S G A R D tt'EST VALLET QEPT. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
4059 South 4000 West 
West Valley City, Utah 84120 
Telephone: (801) 967-5500 
Fax: (801) 967-5563 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WEST VALLEY CITY, ) AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT 
) CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
Plaintiff, ) AND ORDER 
vs. ) 
) Case No. 901001586 
DENNIS STREETER, ) 
Defendant. ) 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
COMES NOW, DENNIS STREETER, the defendant in this case and 
hereby acknowledges and certifies the following: 
I have entered a conditional plea of guilty to the crime of 
Cruelty to Animals, a violation of West Valley City Municipal 
Ordinance 23-5-104, a Class B Misdemenaor as charged in Count I 
of the information filed against me. I understand that the 
penalties provided are as follows: For the Class B Misdemeanor 
as charged in Count I, a maximum fine of $1,000.00 and/or 
imprisonment of up to six months. I enter this plea of guilty 
conditionally and specifically reserve my right to challenge the 
constitutionality of West Valley City Municipal Ordinance 
23-5-104. I have received a copy of the information against me. 
I have read it, and I understand the nature and the elements of 
the offenses for which I am entering my conditional plea of 
guilty. 
The elements of the crime of which I am charged is as 
follows: A person commits Cruelty to Animals if he raises, keeps 
or uses any animal, fowl or bird for the purpose of fighting or 
baiting. 
I am entering this plea voluntarily and with knowledge and 
understanding of the following facts: 
I am entering this plea voluntarily and with knowledge and 
understanding of the following facts: 
1. I know that I have the right to be represented by an 
attorney and that if I cannot afford one, an attorney will be 
appointed by the court at no cost to me. 
2. I have not waived my right to counsel. My attorney is 
Michelle J. Ivie and I have had an opportunity to discuss this 
statement, my irights and the consequences of my guilty plea with 
my attorney. 
3. I know that I have a right to a trial by jury. 
4. I know that if I wish to have a trial I have the right 
to confront and cross-examine witnesses against me or to have 
them cross-examined by my attorney. I also know that I have the 
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right to compel my witnelss(es) by subpoena at state expense to 
testify in court upon my behalf. 
5. I know that I h^ve a right to testify in my own behalf 
but if I choose not to dd so I cannot be compelled to testify or 
give evidence against myself and no adverse inferences will be 
drawn against me if I do not testify. 
6. I know that if I wish to contest the charges against me 
I need only plead "not guilty" and the matter will be set for 
trial. At the trial the State of Utah will have the burden of 
proving each element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. If 
the trial is before a jury, the verdict must be unanimous. 
7. I know that under the Constitution of Utah that if I 
were tried and convicted by a jury or by the judge that I would 
have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Utah 
Court of Appeals or, where allowed, the Utah Supreme Court and 
that if I could not afford to pay the costs for such appeal, 
those costs would be paid- by the state. 
8. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each 
offense to which I plead guilty. I know that by pleading guilty 
to an offense that carries a minimum mandatory sentence that I 
will be subjecting myself to serving a minimum mandatory sentence 
for that offense. I know that the sentences may be consecutive 
and may be for a prison term, fine, or both. I know that in 
addition to a fine a twenty-five percent (25%) surcharge, 
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required by Utah Code Annotated §63-63a-4, will be imposed. I 
also know that I may be ordered by the court to make restitution 
to any victim(s) of my crimes. 
9. I know that imprisonment may be for consecutive periods, 
or the fine for additional amounts, if my plea is to more than 
one charge. I also know that if I am on probation, parole, or 
awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I have been 
convicted or to which I have plead guilty, my plea in the present 
action may result in consecutive sentences being imposed upon me. 
10. I know and understand that by entering a conditional 
plea of guilty, I am waiving my statutory and constitutional 
rights set out in the preceding paragraphs, with the exception of 
my constitutional right to challenge the constitutionality of 
West Valley City Ordinance 23-5-102, pursuant to my conditional 
guilty plea hereunder. I also know that by entering such plea, I 
am admitting cind do so admit that I have committed the conduct 
alleged and I am guilty of the crime for which my plea is en-
tered. 
11. My plea of guilty is the result of a plea bargain, to 
wit: the prosecutor has agreed to dismiss the remaining counts of 
the information against me. As further part of that plea bar-
gain, the prosecutor has agreed to dismiss a case pending against 
me in the circuit court before Judge William A. Thome. The 
prosecution and defendant have also agreed that the defendant may 
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enter the plea set forth above while preserving the right to 
appeal the court's ruling on the constitutionality of West Valley 
City Ordinance 23-5-104 and the defendant expressly reserves his 
right to appeal the court's denial of his motion to dismiss. 
12. I know and understand that if I desire to withdraw my 
plea of guilty I must do so by filing a motion within thirty (30) 
days after entry of my pleaf but that if I do not receive pro-
bation the State will stipulate to the withdrawal of this plea. 
13. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or 
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a 
reduction of the charges for sentencing made or sought by either 
defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding on 
the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as 
to what they believe the court may do are also not binding on the 
court. 
14. No threats, coercion, or unlawful influence of any kind 
have been made to induce me to plead guilty, and no promises 
except those contained herein have been made to me. 
15. I have read this statement or I have had it read to me 
by my attorney, and I understand its provisions. I know that I 
am free to change or delete anything contained in this statement. 
I do not wish to make any changes because all of the statements 
are correct. 
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16. I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my 
attorney. 
17. I am 43 years of age; I have attended high school and I 
can read and understand the English language or an interpreter 
has been provided to me. I was not under the influence of any 
drugs, medication or intoxicants which would impair my judgment 
when the decision was made to enter the plea. I am not presently 
under the influence of any drug, medication or intoxicants which 
impair my judgment. 
18. I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind, 
mentally capable of understanding the proceedings and the conse-
quences of my plea and free of any mental disease, defect or 
impairment that would prevent me from knowingly, intelligently 
and voluntarily entering my plea. 
DATED this ^ O day of A/) A fc. , 1992. 
DENNIS STREETER 
'SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on this Q<^ day of C 
msoiJLL, , 1992. 
NOTARY PUBLIC ~1 
SHELLY DEAL , 
^ V ^ r S l Y V i y We*» vaifcy C.t# 'Jt&n 64120 \ £ ^ ..' * / My Carn.-XMiswn ejtp*re« 4/12/94 
Residing 
STATE OF UTAH 
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CERTIFICATE OF ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for Dennis Streeter, the 
defendant above, and that I know he has read the statement or 
that I have read it to him and I have discussed it with him and 
believe he fully understands the meaning of its contents and is 
mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge 
and belief after an appropriate investigation, the elements of 
the crimes and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal 
conduct are correctly stated and these, along with the other 
representations and declarations made by the defendant in the 
foregoing affidavit, are accurate and true. 
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CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in 
the case against Dennis Streeter, defendant. I have reviewed 
this statement of the defendant and find that the declaration, 
including the elements of the offense of the charge and the 
factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct which 
constitutes the offense are true and correct. No improper 
inducements, threats or coercion to encourage a plea have been 
offered defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained in 
the statement and in the attached plea agreement or as 
supplemented on record before the court. There is reasonable 
cause to believe that the evidence would support the conviction 
of defendant for the offense for which the plea is entered and 
acceptance of the plea would serve the-""ptrbiic interest* 
KEITH L. STONEY/ 
West Valley Ci£y Prosecutor 
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ORDER 
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing statement 
and the certification of the defendant and counsel, the court 
witnesses the signatures and finds the defendant's .conditional 
plea of guilty, all freely and voluntarily made and it is so 
ordered that the defendant's conditional plea^-of guilty to the 
charges set forth in the statement be accepted and entered. 
DONE IN COURT this J?/ day of ' / ^ ^ ^ \ , 1992. -
JB-irs l^ rJr^ fc .Court .Judge 
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THIRD CIRCUIT COURT - WVC 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CITY OF WEST VALLEY CITY JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
VS (COMMITMENT) 
STREETER, DENNIS L CASE NO: 901001586 
3551 S 7200 W DOB: 12/30/48 
WVC UT 8412 0 TAPE: COUNT: 
DATE: 04/30/92 
THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT BEING ADJUDGED GUILTY FOR THE 
OFFENSE(S) AS FOLLOWS: 
Charge: 23-5-104 CRUELTY TO ANIMALS 
Plea: Guilty Find: Guilty Plea 
Fine: 1000.00 Susp: 1000.00 
Jail: 60 DA Susp: 60 DA ACS: 
Charge: 23-5-104 CRUELTY TO ANIMALS 
Plea: Find: Dismissed 
Fine: 0.00 Susp: 0.00 
Jail: 0 Susp: 0 ACS: 
Charge: 23-5-104 CRUELTY TO ANIMALS 
Plea: Find: Dismissed 
Fine: 0.00 Susp: 0.00 
Jail: 0 Susp: 0 ACS: 
Charge: 2 3-5-104 CRUELTY TO ANIMALS 
Plea: Find: Dismissed 
Fine: 0.00 Susp: 0.00 
Jail: 0 Susp: 0 ACS: 
Charge: 23-5-104 CRUELTY TO ANIMALS 
Plea: Find: Dismissed 
F i n e : 0 .00 Sl isp: 0 . 0 0 
J a i l : 0 S u s p : 0 ACS: 
Charge: 23-5-104 CRUELTY TO ANIMALS 
Plea: Find: Dismissed 
Fine: 0.00 Susp: 0.00 
Jail: 0 Susp: 0 ACS: 
FEES AND ASSESSMENTS: 
Fine Description: Fine- Prosecutor Spl 
Credit: 0.00 Paid: 0.00 Due: 0.00 
STREETER, DENNIS L CASE NO: 901001586 PAGE 2 
TRACKING: 





Defendant, Counsel and Prosecutor not present 
Judge: THORNE, WILLIAM A. 
Chrg: CRUELTY/ANIMALS Plea: Guilty Find 
Fine Amount: 1000.00 Suspended: 
Jail: 60 DAYS Suspended: 60 DAYS 
TERMS; 1. FINE AND JAIL TO BE SUSP IF DEF COMPLIES WITH TERMS 2 
12 MONTHS PROBATION TO COURT NO OTHER VIOLATIONS 3. REVIEW LAW 
AND GET INTOA COMPLIANCE 3. RESTRAINING ORDER TO BE LIFTED. 4. 
DEF ENTERED CONDITIONAL PLEA ON CHARGE. 
BY THE COURT 
NOTE: APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 3 0 DAYS 
OF ENTRY OF THIS JUDGMENT. »c 
THIRD CIRCUIT COURT - WVC 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CITY OF WEST VALLEY CITY JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
VS (COMMITMENT) 
STREETER, DENNIS CASE NO: 901001677 
3551 S 7200 W DOB: / / 
'ATC UT 84120 TAPE: COUNT: 
DATE: 04/3 0/92 
THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT BEING ADJUDGED GUILTY FOR THE 
OFFENSE(S) AS FOLLOWS: 
Charge: 17-1-102 DO BUSINESS W/O LIC 
Plea: Guilty Find: Guilty Plea 
Fine: 1000.00 Susp: 1000.00 
Jail: 60 DA Susp: 60 DA ACS: 
Charge: 7-9-103 IMP USES FOR R-1-8 ZONE 
Plea: Guilty Find: Guilty Plea 
Fine: 0.00 Susp: 0.00 
Jail: 0 Susp: 0 ACS: 
Charge: 7-9-103 IMP USES FOR R-1-8 ZONE 
Plea: Find: Dismissed 
Fine: 0.00 Susp: 0.00 
Jail: 0 Susp: 0 ACS: 
Charge: 23-5-104 CRUELTY TO ANIMALS 
Plea: Guilty Find: Guilty Plea 
Fine: 0.00 Susp: 0.00 
Jail: 0 Susp: 0 ACS: 
Charge: 23-3-101 FAIL TO LIC DOG 
Plea: Find: Dismissed 
Fine: 0.00 Susp: 0.00 
Jail: 0 Susp: 0 ACS: 
Charge: 23-3-101 FAIL TO LIC DOG 
Plea: Find: Dismissed 
Fine: 0.00 Susp: 0.00 
Jail: 0 Susp: 0 ACS: 
Charge: 23-4-102 FAIL TO OBT RABIES VACC 
Plea: Find: Dismissed 
Fine: 0.00 Susp: 0.00 
Jail: 0 Susp: 0 ACS: 
STREETER, DENNIS CASE NO: 901001677 PAGE 2 
Charge: 24-1-11 ACCUMULATIpN OF SOLID WASTE & LITTERING 
Plea: Guilty Find: Guilty Plea 
Fine: 0 00 Susp: 0.00 
Jail: 0 Susp: 0 ACS: 
Charge: 7-2-119 IMP HEIGHT1 FOR FENCES 
Plea: Fjind: Dismissed 
Fine: 0.00 Susp: 0.00 
Jail: 0 Susp: 0 ACS: 
TRACKING: 





Defendant, Counsel and Prosecutor not present 
Judge: THORNE, WILLIAM A. 
Chrg: DO BUSNS W/o LIC Plea: GuiLty Find 
Fine Amount: 1000.00 Suspended: 
Jail: 60 DAYS Suspended: 60 DAYS 
TERMS: 1. DEF TO BE ON PROB TO COURT WITH NO OTHER VIOLATION. 2. 
FINE AND JAIL TO BE SUSPENDED UPON DEF COMPLYING WITH ALL TERMS, 
3. RESTRAINING ORDER LIFTED. 4. DEF TO REVIEW LAW AND GET IN 
COMPLAIANCE. 
5. DEF ENTERED CONDITIONAL PLEA ON CNT 2, IMP USE FOR R-l-8 ZONE 
~* <' 
NOTE: APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 3 0 DAXS' 
OF ENTRY OF THIS JUDGMENT. > 
JUDGE, CIRCUIT COURT 
CHAPTER 2 
ANIMAL CONTROL OFFICIALS 
SECTION 23-2-101. DUTIES OF ANIMAL CONTROL OFFICIALS. 
SECTION 23-2-102. POWERS OF ANIMAL CONTROL OFFICIALS. 
SECTION 23-2-103. OFFICER'S AUTHORITY TO TAKE POSSESSION OF ANIMALS 
- LIEN FOR CARE. 
SECTION 23-2-104. INTERFERENCE WITH OFFICER PROHIBITED. 
SECTION 23-2-101. DOTIES OF ANIMAL CONTROL OFFICIALS. 
(1) The Anirral Control Director shall: 
(a) Enforce this ordinance and perform other responsibilities 
pursuant thereto. 
(b) Supervise tne municipal animal shelter(s) under his 
jurisdiction. 
(c) Keep adequate records of all animals impounded and all moneys 
collected. 
(d) See that all animals and animal holding facilities in nis 
jurisdiction are licensed, controlled and permittee m 
accordance v;itn any applicable, ordinance and/or regulations. 
(e) Establish, m cooperation with the Salt Lake City/County Healtn 
Department and other interested governmental agencies, adequate 
measures for rabies immunization and control. 
(2) Eacn Animal Control Officer shall: 
(a) Enforce t m s Chapter in all respects pertaining to animal 
control w i t n m the jurisdiction, including the care and 
impounding of animals and prevention of cruelty to animals. 
(b) Carry out all duties prescribed or celegated by the director. 
SECTION 23-2-102. POWERS OF ANIMAL CCNTROL OFFICIALS. 
(1) The Animal Control Director or any person employed by the Department 
ct Animal Control as an Animal Control Officer snail take the oath of office 
anc snail be vested witn the power and authority to enforce this ordinance. 
(2) The Animal Control Director, his deputies, assistants and Animal 
Control Officers are hereby authorized and empowered to apprehend and take 
with them and impound any animal found in violation of this ordinance 
including, but not limited to unlicensed dogs. 
(3) In the enforcement of this ordinance, any peace officer or the 
Director of Animal Control or his assistants are authorized to enter onto the 
open premises of any person to take possession of any dog in violation of this 
ordinance. 
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SECTION 23-2 -103 . OFFICER'S AUTHORITY TO TAKE POSSESSION OF ANIMALS - LIEN 
FOR CARE. 
(1) Any law Enforcement (JDfficer may take possession of any animals being 
treated cruelly and, after rea$onable. efforts to notify the owner, may provide 
shelter and care for them or', upon permission from the owner, may destroy 
them. 
(2) Officers caring for animals pursuant to this section have a lien for 
die reasonable value of the care and/or destruction. Any court, upon proof-
that the owner has been notified of the lien and amount due at least 5 days 
prior, shall order the animal sold at public auction or destroyed. 
(3) Any Law Enforcement Officer may humanely destroy any animal found 
suffering past recovery for any useful purpose. Before destroying the animal, 
zfie officer shall obtain the judgment to the effect of a veterinarian, or of 2 
reputable citizens called by him to vi^7 the animal in his presence, or shall 
obtain consent to the destruction from the owner of the animal. 
SECTION 23-2-104. INESRFERENCE WITH OFFICER PROHIBITED. 
It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly and intentionally 
interfere with the director or any Animal Control Officer in the lawful 
discharge of his duties as herein prescribed. 
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(3) Care and maintenance: It shall be the duty of any person to provide 
any aniinal in his charge or custody, as owner or otherwise, with adequate 
food, drink, care and shelter. 
(4) Animals in vehicles: It shall be unlawful for any parson to carry 
or confine any aniiral in or upon any vehicle in a cruel or inhumane manner, 
including but not limited to, carrying or confining such animal without 
adequate ventilation or for an unusual length of time. 
(5) Abandonment of animals: It shall be unlawful for any parson to 
abandon any animal within the jurisdiction. 
(6) Animal poisoning: Except as provided in Section 25 herein, it shall 
be unlawful for any person by any mean^ to make accessible to any aniiral, with 
intent to cause harm or death, any substance which has in any manner been 
treated or prepared with any harmful or poisonous substance. This provision 
shall not be interpreted so as to prohibit the use of poisonous substances for 
the control of vermin in furtherance of the public health when applied in such 
a manner as to reasonably prohibit access to other animals. 
(7) Injury to animals by motorists: 
(a) Every operator of a motor or other self-propelled vehicle upon 
the streets of the jurisdiction shall iirrrediately upon 
injuring, striking, maiming or running down any domestic animal 
give such aid as can reasonably be rendered. In the absence of 
the owner, he shall immediately notify the Office cf Animal 
Control, furnishing facts relative to such injury. 
(b) It shall be the duty of such operator to rerain ar or near the 
scene until such thve as the appropriate authorities arrive, 
and upon the arrival of such authorities, the operator shall 
immadiately identify himself to such authorities. Alterna-
tively, in the absence of the owner, a person may give aid by 
taking the aniiral to the Animal Control facility or other 
appropriate facility and notifying the Office of Animal 
Control. Such animal may be taken in by the Animal Control 
Facility and dealt with as deemed appropriate under the 
circumstances. 
(c) Emergency vehicles are exempted from the requirements of this 
provision. 
(8) Animals for fighting: 
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person or corporation to raise, 
keep or use any animal, fowl or bird for the purpose of 
fighting or baiting; and for any person to be a perty to or be 
present as a spectator, at any such fighting or baiting of any 
aniiral or fowl; and for any person, firm or corporation to 
knowingly rent any building, shed, rocm, yard, ground or 
premises for any such purposes as aforesaid, or to knowingly 
suffer or permit the use of his buildings, sheds, roans, yards, 
grounds or premises for the purposes aforesaid. 
(b) Law Enforcement Officers or Office of Animal Control officials 
may enter any building or place where there is an exhibition of 
the fighting or baiting of a live animal, or where preparations 
are being made fqr such an exhibition, and the Law Enforcenent 
Officers nay arrest persons there present and take possession 
of all animals engaged in fighting, or there found for the 
purposes of fighting, along with all implements or applications 
used in such exhibition. This provision shall not be inter-
preted to authorize a search or arrest without a warrant when 
such is required by law. 
(9) Killing of birds: It shall be unlawful for any person to take or 
kill any bird(s), or to rob or destroy any nest, egg or young of any bird in 
violation of the laws of the State of Utah. 
(10) Malicious impounding: It shall be unlawful for any person mali-
cioiisly to secret or impound the aniiral of anoth€or. 
(11) Keeping of diseased or painfully crippled animals: 
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person to abandon or turn out at 
large any sick, diseased or disabled animal, but such animal 
shall, when rendered worthless by reason of sickness of other 
disability, be killed in a humane manner by the owner thereof 
and disposed of as instructed after contacting the Office of 
Animal Control. 
(b) It shall further be unlawful for the owner or person having the 
charge, care, custody and control of such animal infected with 
dangerous or incurable and/or painfully crippling condition to 
have, keep or harbor such aniiral without placing the sams under 
veterinary care or to dispose of the sane. The failure to take 
such care is a violation of this ordinance and the Office of 
Aniiral Control may take custody of such animals and deal with 
then as deemed appropriate under the circumstances. 
(12) It is a defense to the prosecution under this section that the 
conduct of the actor towards the aniiral was by a licensed veterinarian using 
accepted veterinary practice or directly related to a bona fide 
experimentation for scientific research provided that if the aniiral is to be 
destroyed, the manner enployed will not be unnecessarily cruel unless directly 
necessary to the veterinary purpose or scientific research involved. 
SECTION 23-5-105. SBECZKKR AT ORGANIZED ANIMAL FIGHT. 
(1) It is unlawful for any person to be a spectator at an organized 
animal fight. 
(2) For the purpose of this section only, an organized animal fight 
ireans a fight between aniinals for the benefit of spectators. There is no 
requirement that an admission fee be charged. 
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with section 2156 of this title, as so amended, shall commence upon 
the expiration of s^id ninety-day pence. In all other respects, e?jd 
"~" end men is fhall bcoornc effective upon April 22, 1976. 
(Pub.L. 39-544, § 24, Aug. 24, 1966, 80 Stat. 353; Pub.L. 94-279, § 15, Apr. 22, 1976, 90 Stat. 421.) 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Revision Note* and Legislative Reports the Code, see Short Title note set out 
1966 Act. Senate Report No. 1281, under section 2131 of this title and Ta-
Conference Report No. 1848, see 1966 bles volume. 
U.S.Code Cong, and Adm.News, p. 2635.
 0 . . ,, v , N , , .* c 
fT ^ l t „ nA1 Subsections (b), (c), and (d) of section 
1976 Act House Report No. 94-301, 2143 of this title, referred to in text, were 
House Conference Report No 94-976,
 r e d e , i g n a t e d subsecs. (f), (g), and (h), 
see 1976 U.S.Code Cong, and Adm.News,
 r e s p e c ( i v e i V f a n d n e w s u b s e c s . (b ) f (c)> 
P' and (d) of .section 2143 were enacted, by 
References In Text Pub.L. 99-198. Title XVII, § 1752(a)(1), 
The Animal Welfare Act Amendments (c), Dec. 23, 1985, 99 Slat. 1645, 1647. 
of 1976, referred to in text, is Pub.L. 
94-279, Apr. 22, 1976, 90 Stat. 417, Amendments 
which enacted section 2156 of this title, 1976 Amendment. Pub.L. 94-279 add-
amended sections 2131, 2132, 2134, ed provisions setting particular effective 
2136, 2139 to 2146, 2149, 2153 to 2155 of dates of compliance for intermediate 
this title, and section 3001 of Title 39, handlers and carriers and for dealers, 
Postal Service, repealed section 2150 of exhibitors, operators of auction sales, 
this title, and enacted provisions set out and research facilities with respect to the 
as notes under section 2131 of this title. amendments made by the Animal Wel-
For complete classification of this Act to fare Act Amendments of 1976. 
WESTLAW ELECTRONIC RESEARCH 
See WESTLAW Electronic Research Guide following the Explanation. 
§ 2155* Annual report to the President of the Senate and the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives 
Not later than March of each year, the Secretary shall submit to 
the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives a comprehensive and detailed written report with 
respect to— 
(1) the identification of all research facilities, exhibitors, and 
other persons and establishments licensed by the Secretary 
under section 2133 and section 2142 of this title; 
(2) the nature and place of all investigations and inspections 
conducted by the Secretary under section 2146 of this title, and 
all reports received by the Secretary under section 2143 of this 
title; 
(3) recommendations for legislation to improve the adminis-
tration of this chapter or any provisions thereof; and 
(4) recommendations and conclusions concerning the air-
craft environment as it relates to the carriage of live animals in 
air transportation. 
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This report as well as any supporting documents, data, or findings 
shall not be released to any other n^-^p^, r»r>p-Fcdera! agencies re-
organizations unless and until it b?s been made public by an 
appropriate committee of the Senate or the House of Representa-
tives. 
(Pub.L. 89-544, § 25, as added Pub.L. 91-579, § 22, Dec. 24, 1970, 84 Stat. 
1565, and amended Pub.L. 94-279, § 16, Apr. 22, 1976, 90 Stat. 421.) 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Revision Notes and Legislative Reports Amendments 
1970 Act. House Report No. 91-1651, 1976 Amendment. Par. (4). Pub.L. 






 Effective Dates 
1976 Act. House Report No. 94-801, 1970 Act. Section effective one >ear 
Hotise Conference Report No. 94-976, after Dec. 74, 1970, see section 23 of 
see 1976 U.S.Code Cong, and Adm.News, Pub.L. 91-579, set out as a note under 
p. 758. section 2131 of this title. 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
American Digest System 
Cruelty to animals, see Animals <$=>38 to 40. 
Encyclopedias 
Cruelty to animals, see CJ.S. Animals § 99 et seq. 
WESTLAW ELECTRONIC RESEARCH 
See WESTLAW Electronic Research Guide following the Explanation. 
§ 2 1 5 6 . Animal fighting venture prohibition 
(a) Sponsoring or exhibiting animal In any fighting venture 
It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly sponsor or 
exhibit an animal in any animal fighting venture to which any 
animal was moved in interstate or foreign commerce. 
(b) Buying, selling, delivering, or transporting animals for participation In 
animal fighting venture 
It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly sell, buy, 
transport, or deliver to another person or receive from another 
person for purposes of transportation, in interstate or foreign com-
merce, any dog or other animal for purposes of having the dog or 
other animal participate in an animal fighting venture. 
(c) Use of Postal Service or other Interstate instrumentality for promoting 
or furthering animal fighting venture 
It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly use the mail 
service of the United States Tostal Service or any interstate instru-
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thering an animal fighting venture except as performed outside the 
limits of the States of the United States. 
(d) Violation of State law 
Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of 
this section, the activities prohibited by such subsections shall be 
unlawful with respect to fighting ventures involving live birds only 
if the fight is to take place in a State where it would be in violation 
of the laws thereof. 
(e) Penalties 
Any person who violates subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section 
shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned for not more 
than 1 year, or both, for each such violation. 
(f) Investigation of violations by Secretary; assistance by other federal 
agencies; issuance of search warrant; forfeiture; costs recoverable 
In forfeiture or civil action 
The Secretary or any other person authorized by him shall make 
such investigations as the Secretary deems necessary to determine' 
whether any person has violated or is violating any provision of this 
section, and the Secretary may obtain the assistance of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, the Department of the Treasury, or other 
law enforcement agencies of the United States, and State and local 
governmental agencies, in the conduct of such investigations, under 
cooperative agreements with such agencies. A warrant to search 
for and seize any animal which there is probable cause to believe 
was involved in any violation 6f this section may be issued by any 
judge of the United States or of a State court of record or by a 
United States magistrate within the district wherein the animal 
sought is located. Any United States marshal or any person autho-
rized under this section to conduct investigations may apply for and 
execute any such warrant, and any animal seized under such a 
warrant shall be held by the United States marshal or other autho-
rized person pending disposition thereof by the court in accordance 
with this subsection. Necessary care including veterinary treat-
ment shall be provided while the animals are so held in custody. 
Any animal involved in any violation of this section shall be liable 
to be proceeded against and forfeited to the United States at any 
time on complaint filed in any United States district court or other 
court of the United States for any jurisdiction in which the animal 
is found and upon a judgment ol forfeiture shall bo disposed of by 
—i- r~_ i*,*,f,,i ™it-v^c*c tM* ki/ ntUov humane means, as the court 
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in a separate civil action brought in the jurisdiction in which the 
owner is found, resides, or transacts business. 
(g) Definitions 
For purposes of this section— 
(1) the term "animal fighting venture" means any event 
which involves a fight between at least two animals and is 
conducted for purposes of sport, wagering, or entertainment 
except that the term "animal fighting venture" shall not be 
deemed to include any activity the primary purpose of which 
involves the use of one or more animals in hunting another 
animal or animals, such as waterfowl, bird, raccoon, or fox 
hunting; 
(2) the term "interstate or foreign commerce" means— 
(A) any movement between any place in a State to any 
place in another State or between places in the same State 
through another State; or 
(B) any movement from a foreign country into any State; 
(3) the term "interstate instrumentality" means telegraph, 
telephone, radio, or television operating in interstate or foreign 
commerce; 
(4) the term "State" means any State of the United States, the 
District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and 
any territory or possession of the United States; 
(5) the term "animal" means any live bird, or any live dog or 
other mammal, except man; and 
(6) the conduct by any person of any activity prohibited by 
this section shall not render such person subject to the other 
sections of this chapter as a dealer, exhibitor, or otherwise. 
(h) Conflict with State law 
The provisions of this chapter shall not supersede or otherwise 
invalidate any such State, local, or municipal legislation or ordi-
nance relating to animal fighting ventures except in case of a direct 
and irreconcilable conflict between any requirements thereunder 
and this chapter or any rule, regulation, or standard hereunder. 
(Pub.L. 89-544, § 26(a)-(h)(l), as added Pub.L. 94-279, § 17, Apr. 22, 1976, 
90 Stat. 421.) 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Revision No tea and Legislative Reports Codification* 
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by ' Pub.L. 94-279, amended section 
3001(a) of Title 39, Postal Service. 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
American Digest System 
Cruelty to animals, see Animals <s=>38 to 40. 
Encyclopedias 
Cruelty to animals, see C.J.S. Animals § 99 ct scq. 
WESTLAW ELECTRONIC RESEARCH 
See WESTLAW Electronic Research Guide following the Explanation. 
§ 2 1 5 7 . Release of trade secrets 
(a) Release of confidential information prohibited 
It shall be unlawful for any member of an Institutional Animal 
Committee to release any confidential information of the research 
facility including any information that concerns or relates to— 
(1) the trade secrets, processes, operations, style of work, or 
apparatus; or 
(2) the identity, confidential statistical data, amount or 
source of any income, profits, losses, or expenditures, 
of the research facility. 
(b) Wrongful use of confidential Information prohibited 
It shall be unlawful for any member of such Committee— 
(1) to use or attempt to use to his advantages; or 
(2) to reveal tc any other person, 
any information which is entitled to protection as confidential 
information under subsection (a) of this section. 
(c) Penalties 
A violation of subsection (a) or (b) of this section is punishable 
by— 
(!) removal from such Committee; and 
(2)(A) a fine of not more than $1,000 and imprisonment of 
not more than one year; or 
(B) if such violation is willful, a fine of not more than 
$10,000 and imprisonment of not more than three years. 
(d) Recovery of damages by injured person; costs; attorney's fee 
Any person, including any research facility, injured in its business 
or property by reason of a violation of this section may recover all 
actual and consequential damages sustained by such person and the 
cost of the suit including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
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(e) Other rights and remedies 
Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect any other 
rights of a person injured in its business or property by reason of a 
violation of this section. Subsection (d) of this section shall not be 
construed to limit the exercise of any such rights arising out of or* 
relating to a violation of subsections (a) and (b) of this section. 
(Pub.L. 89-544, § 27, as added Pub.L. 99-198, Title XVII, § 1754, Dec. 23, 
1985, 99 Stat. 1649.) 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Revision Notes and Legislative Reports Effective Dates 
1985 Act. House Report Nos. 99- 1985 Act. Section effective one year 
271(1), 99-271(11), Senate Report No. 99-
 afler Dec. 23, 1985, see section 1759 of 
145, House Conference Report No. 99- pUD.L. 99-198, set'out as a note under 
447, and Statements by Legislative lead-
 s e c t i o n 2 m o f t h i s t h , ^ 
ers, sec 1985 U.S.Code Cong, and Adm. 
News, p. 1103. 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
American Digest System 
Cruelty to animals, see Animals «3=>38 to 40. 
Encyclopedias 
Cruelty to animals, see C.J.S. Animals § 99 et seq. 
WESTLAW ELECTRONIC RESEARCH 
See WESTLAW Electronic Research Guide following the Explanation. 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
P.L. 94-279 
of the act, as amended, which relate.to them to commence 90 days 
after promulgation of regulations under section 13 of the act, as 
amended, which shall be not later than 9 months after enactment; 
(2) to require compliance by dealers, exhibitors, operators of auction 
sales, and research facilities with other provisions ox the act, as 
amended, and the implementing regulations 90 days after enact-
ment; and to require compliance by all persons with the veterinary 
certificate, young animal, and C.O.D. amendments to section 13 of 
the act S)0% days after enactment. All other amendments, princi-
pally section 26 (animal fighting ventures), would become effective 
upon the date of enactment. 
[page 22] 
Conference substitute 
The Conference substitute adopts the House provision with an 
amendment which makes new section 26 of the act (animal fighting 
ventures) effective 90 days after enactment of these amendmenfs. 
28. ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS (SECTION 23 OF EXISTING LAW) 
Senate bill 
The Senate bill amends section 25 of the act to require the 
Secretary of Agriculture to include in his annual report to the Con-
gress recommendations and conclusions concerning flight safety, in-
cluding the aircraft, its environment, or equipment as they relate to 
the carriage of live animals in air transportation, but only those rec-
ommendations and conclusions which have been approved by the 
Secretary of Transportation, tlte Administrator of the FAA, and the 
Chairman of the CAB. 
House amendment 
The House amendment would amend section 25 of the act to re-
quire the Secretary to include in his annual report to the Congress 
recommendations and conclusions concerning the aircraft environment 
as it relates to the carriage of live animals in air transportation. 
Conference substitute 
The Conference substitute adopts the House provision. 
29. ANIMAL FIGHTING (NEW SECTION 26) 
Senate bill 
The iSenate bill contains no provisions relating to animal fighting 
ventures. 
House .amendment 
The House amendment adds to the act a new section 26 which 
would subject to a fine of not more than $5,000 or imprisonment for 
not more than 1 year, or both, any person who knowingly (a) 
sponsors or exhibits an animal in any fighting venture to which any 
animal was moved in interstate or foreign commerce, (b) sells, buys, 
transports, or delivers to another person or receives from another 
person for purposes of transportation in interstate or foreign com-
merce any dog or other animal for purposes of having the dog or other 
animal participate in an animal fighting venture, or (c) uses the U.S. 
mails or any interstate instrumentality for purposes of promoting or 
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furthering an animal fighting venture held within the United States. 
The Secretary of Agriculture would be authorized to make such in-
vestigations as he deems necessary and to enlist the assistance of the 
FBI, Treasury, or other Federal, State or local law enforcement 
agencies. The provisions of this new section would not supersede or 
otherwise invalidate any State, local, or municipal legislation or 
ordinance relating to animal fighting ventures except in case of a 
direct ahd irreconcilable conflict. For purposes of this new section of 
the act,, the term "animal" would be defined to mean any live bird, 
or any l&ve dog or other mammal, except man. 
[page 23] 
Conference substitute 
The Conference substitute adopts the House provision with an 
amendment which provides that the activities prohibited by subsec-
tions (a,), (b), or (c) of new section 26 of the act shall be unlawful 
with respect to fighting ventures involving live birds only if the fight 
is to tajie place in a State where it would be in violation of the laws 
thereof,|!The section does not apply to export of live birds to foreign 
countries nor to interstate shipment of live birds for breeding pur-
poses. Game fowl publications would be unaffected except that adver-
tising of fights involving live birds would be prohibited except in those 
instances wrhere such fights are to be held in a State or territory where 
they are not unlawful. 
THOMAS S. FOLEY, 





Managers on the Part of the House. 
WARREN G. MAGNUSON, 
WENDELL H. FORD, 
LOWELL P. WEICKER, Jr., 
Managers on the Part of the Senate. 
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Art. XI, § 5 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec. 5. {Municipal corporations — To be created by gen-
eral law — Right and manner of adopting charter 
| for own government — Powers included.] 
Corporations for municipal purposes shall not be created by special laws. 
The legislature by general laws shall provide for the incorporation, organiza-
tion and classification of cities and towns in proportion to population, which 
laws may be altered, amended or repealed. Any incorporated city or town may 
frame and adopt a charter for its own government in the following manner: 
The legislative authority of the city may, by two-thirds vote of its members, 
and upon petition of qualified electors to the number of fifteen per cent of all 
votes cast at the next preceding election for the office of the mayor, shall 
forthwith provide by ordinance for the submission to the electors of the ques-
tion: "Shall a commission be chosen to frame a charter?" The ordinance shall 
require that the question be submitted to the electors at the next regular 
municipal election. The ballot containing such question shall also contain the 
names of candidates for members of the proposed commission, but without 
party designation. Such candidates shall be nominated in the same manner as 
required by law for nomination of city officers. If a majority of the electors 
voting on the question of choosing a commission shall vote in the affirmative, 
then the fifteen candidates receiving a majority of the votes cast at such 
election, shall constitute the charter commission, and shall proceed to frame a 
charter. 
Any charter so framed shall be submitted to the qualified electors of the city 
at an election to be held at a time to be determined by the charter commission, 
which shall be not less than sixty days subsequent to its completion and 
distribution among the electors and not more than one year from such date. 
Alternative provisions may also be submitted to be voted upon separately. 
The commission shall make provisions for the distribution of copies of the 
proposed charter and of any alternative provisions to the qualified electors of 
the city, not less than sixty days before the election at which it is voted upon. 
Such proposed charter and such alternative provisions as are approved by a 
majority of the electors voting thereon, shall become an organic law of such 
city at such time as may be fixed therein, and shall supersede any existing 
charter and all laws affecting the organization and government of such city 
which are now in conflict therewith. Within thirty days after its approval a 
copy of such charter as adopted, certified by the mayor and city recorder and 
authenticated by the seal of such city, shall be made in duplicate and depos-
ited, one in the office of the secretary of State and the other in the office of the 
city recorder, and thereafter all courts shall take judicial notice of such char-
ter. 
Amendments to any such charter may be framed and submitted by a char-
ter commission in the same manner as provided for making of charters, cr 
may be proposed by the legislative authority of the city upon a two-thirds vote 
thereof, or by petition of qualified electors to a number equal to fifteen per 
cent of the total votes cast for mayor on the next preceding election, and any 
such amendment may be submitted at the next regular municipal election, 
and having been approved by the majority of the electors voting thereon, shall 
become part of the charter at the time fixed in such amendment and shall be 
certified and filed as provided in case of charters. 
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Each city forming its charter under this section shall have, and is hereby 
granted, the authority to exercise all powers relating to municipal affairs, and 
to adopt and enforce within its limits, local police, sanitary and similar regu-
lations not in conflict with the general law, and no enumeration of powers in 
this constitutiqn or any law shall be deemed to limit or restrict the general 
grant of authority hereby conferred; but this grant of authority shall not 
include the power to regulate public utilities, not municipally owned, if any 
such regulation of pubUc utilities is provided for by general law, nor be 
deemed to limit or restrict the power of the legislature in matters relating to 
State affairs, t6 enact general laws applicable alike to all cities of the State. 
The power to be conferred upon the cities by this section shall include the 
following: 
(a) To l£vy, assess and collect taxes and borrow money, within the 
limits prescribed by general law, and to levy and collect special assess-
ments for benefits conferred. 
(b) To furnish all local public services, to purchase, hire, construct, 
own, maintain and operate, or lease, public utilities local in extent and 
use; to acquire by condemnation, or otherwise, within or without the 
corporate limits, property necessary for any such purposes, subject to 
restrictions imposed by general law for the protection of other communi-
ties; and to grant local public utility franchises and within its powers 
regulate the exercise thereof. 
(c) To make local public improvements and to acquire by condemna-
tion, or otherwise, property within its corporate limits necessary for such 
improvements; and also to acquire an excess over than [that] needed for 
any such improvement and to sell or lease such excess property with 
restrictions, in order to protect and preserve the improvement. 
(d) To issue and sell bonds on the security of any such excess property, 
or of any public utility owned by the city, or of the revenues thereof, or 
both, including, in the case of public utility, a franchise stating the terms 
upon which, in case of foreclosure, the-purchaser may operate such util-
ity. 
History: Const. 1896. 
Compiler's Notes. — The bracketed word 
"that" in Subsection (c) of the last paragraph 
appeared in this section as published in the 
Revised Statutes of 1933. 
Cross-References. — Incorporation of cities 
and towns, § 10-2-101 et seq. 
Local improvements, § 10-7-20. 
Miscellaneous powers of cities and towns, 
§ 10-1-202. 
Municipal Code, home rule exceptions to, 
§§ 10-1-106, 10-3-818. 
Powers and duties of all cities, § 10-8-1 et 
seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 





Mass transportation system. 
Municipal power. 
Ordinance licensing nonprofit clubs. 
Police power, 
Repeal of council-manager charter of city. 
Sewage disposal. 
Water conservancy districts. 
Withholding tax provision. 
Cited. 
Classification of cities. 
The power of the legislature to classify cities 
according to population is expressly conferred 
by this section, and statute passed to enable 
cities of first class to meet needs and require-
Power versus right to operate public utility. ments of larger municipalities was general, in 
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